

3 October 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE RECORD

SUBJECT : Talk Before Historical Society, College of  
William and Mary

1. On 1 October, I lectured to the above Society on the subject of intelligence in relation to foreign policy as an identified CIA speaker. Approval for this was granted through usual channels (see memo from me, dated 4 September 1974). I arranged with the President of the Society, Ken Landfield, to limit attendance to its members, and he quite willingly did so. There were about 30 people at the session and there was no unpleasantness whatsoever. (A reporter from the Virginia Gazette had asked to attend, but Landfield, pursuant to a phone conversation with me, told him that such attendance was against Agency policy. This led to an article in the paper, also attached.)

2. I put my talk in an historical framework indicating how the need for an intelligence system had arisen after World War II because of the global interests of the United States. I gave some description of what the new intelligence system was intended to do, talking about in the first instance such traditional intelligence roles as warning of impending attack by an enemy and assessments of industrial and military strength of adversaries or potential adversaries. I went on to discuss aspects such as the centralizing function provided for in the National Security Act of 1947, the role of intelligence analysis as an input to policy making, the use of new and exotic technologies (without going into any detail on these), the understanding of foreign societies, and the conveying of that understanding to policy makers. I talked also of the differences in style as between administrations, contrasting the formal bureaucratic methods of the


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Eisenhower years with the task force, problem-solving approach of the Kennedy administration, for example. And, anticipating that the subject would be raised in questions, I mentioned briefly the Agency's political activities abroad, stressing that these were carried out as directed by the White House and the National Security Council.




3. After the talk, I took questions for a half hour or 40 minutes. These included from "Did the CIA kill Che Guevera?," "Why was the SR-71 developed when it cannot be used to overfly China or the USSR?," "Did I believe that the Agency was going to reduce its overseas action programs?," and so on. A few of the questioners were clearly hostile to the Agency's action role but they were not personally unpleasant. I took the line that I could not discuss operations since that was not my field and, in any event, it was the Agency's policy to report on these matters to the duly constituted authorities in the Congress as representatives of the people. I did tell the person who asked the question about the extent of covert overseas activities that these indeed were much reduced, noting in this respect Mr. Colby's comments made before the Fund for Peace Conference of September 13, 1974. I'm quite sure that the questioner was not convinced, however.

4. I think this was a useful experience, the audience was small enough to have a certain give and take and, while one cannot expect to win over everyone, there is, it seems to me, considerable benefit in having Agency speakers talk with candor about as much of the subject of intelligence and how it fits into policy.

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Deputy Director, Political Research

Attachments: As stated (2)

cc: CAR/ , w/atts (3E63)  
 ✓ ADDI/Mr. Paul Walsh, w/atts (7E44)  
 ADCI/Mr. Angus Thuermer, w/atts (1F04)  
 ODDI/ , w/atts (2F20)  
 DDI/OPR:  10 Oct 74)

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